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SIMON GREENLEAF ON DESUETUDE AND 
JUDGE-MADE LAW: AN UNPUBLISHED 
LETTER TO FRANCIS LIEBER 
MH. Hoeflich* 
Ronald D. Rotunda** 
Time has not dealt fairly with Simon Greenleaf. One of the 
great jurists of his time, his fame has been overshadowed by that of 
one of his Harvard colleagues, Joseph Story.' Yet Greenleaf was 
one of the most thoughtful and productive legal scholars of his age. 2 
Greenleaf was born in 1783 and spent his youth in Maine.3 It 
was there that he studied law and, after his necessary apprentice-
ship, was called to the Bar. When Maine gained statehood in 1820, 
it created a Supreme Judicial Court, and Greenleaf was named as its 
first law reporter. He held this crucial position until 1832. In 1821 
he published his first major scholarly work, his Collection of Cases 
Doubted and Overruled,4 which became a necessary practice hand-
book for his fellow lawyers. At the same time he carried on a suc-
cessful law practice. During this period, Greenleafs reputation 
grew and, in 1833, Harvard appointed him a law professor.s He 
and Joseph Story (appointed in 1829) oversaw the growth of 
• Dean and Professor of Law and History, Syracuse University. 
•• Professor of Law, University of Illinois. 
I. On Story, see R. Kent Newmyer, Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story: Statesman of 
the Old Republic (V. of N.C. Press, 1985). See also, the still useful biography by Story's son 
(and successor at Harvard) William W. Story, Life and Letters of Joseph Story, Associate 
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, and Dane Professor of Law at Harvard 
University (C.C. Little and J. Brown, 1851), and Gerald T. Dunne, Justice Joseph Story and 
the Rise of the Supreme Court (Simon & Schuster, 1970); James McClellan, Joseph Story and 
the American Constitution: A Study in Political and Legal Thought with Selected Writings (V. 
of Okla. Press, 1971); Ronald D. Rotunda and John E. Nowak, Joseph Story: A Man for All 
Seasons, J. ofS. Ct. History: 1990 Yearbook of the Supreme Court Historical Society 17. 
2. Unfortunately, there is no modern biography of Simon Greenleaf. Instead, one 
must use Charles Warren, History of the Harvard Law School and of Early Legal Conditions 
in America, v. I, pp. 480-543 & v. 2, pp. 1-46 (Lewis Pub. Co., 1908) ("History of Harvard"). 
Professor Alfred S. Konefsky of the University of Buffalo is presently engaged in writing a 
biography of Greenleaf, and the authors wish to thank Professor Konefsky for his help with 
this article. 
3. Warren, I History of Harvard at 480 (cited in note 2). 
4. Simon Greenleaf, A Collection of Cases Overruled, Denied, Doubted, or Limited in 
Their Application, Taken from American and English Reports (Arthur Shirley, 1821). 
5. Warren, I History of Harvard at 484 (cited in note 2). In fact, Story himself recom-
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Harvard Law School into the leading law school in the United 
States. During his years at Harvard he produced a number of nota-
ble works, foremost among which was his Treatise on the Law of 
Evidence.6 
In addition to his scholarly writing, Greenleaf was also an ac-
tive letter writer. Among his many correspondents was Francis 
Lieber, to whom the letter printed here was addressed. 
Lieber was a German emigre scholar who led an active and 
varied life.? Exiled from his native Germany, he spent time in Italy 
in the household of the great Roman historian B.G. Niebuhr and 
made his way eventually to the United States.s He lived first in 
Boston where he founded a swimming academy; then in New York 
where he became the founding editor of the Encyclopedia Ameri-
cana; then in Philadelphia where he helped advance Girard College 
and wrote a study of current American penal methods; and then in 
Columbia, South Carolina where he became a professor at South 
Carolina College. 9 It was here that his correspondence with Green-
leaf first flowered (he was already a correspondent of Joseph 
Story).w 
During the 1830's and 1840's Lieber established himself as one 
of the leading American legal and political theorists of his age. He 
authored the Legal and Political Hermeneutics, 11 the first American 
work on legal interpretation, and two major treatises on politics and 
political theory, the Civil Libertyl2 and the Manual of Political Eth-
mended Greenleaf. Arthur E. Sutherland, The Law at Harvard: A History of Ideas and Men, 
1817-1967 122 (Belknap Press, 1967). 
6. Simon Greenleaf, A Treatise on the Law of Evidence (C.C. Little and J. Brown, 
1842). 
7. On Lieber, see Frank B. Freidel, Francis Lieber, Nineteenth-Century Liberal (La. 
State U. Press, 1947) ("Francis Lieber") see also Joseph Dorfman and Rexford G. Tugwell, 
Francis Lieber: German Scholar in America, 30 Colum. U.Q. 159-90, 267-93 (1938). 
8. See M.H. Hoeflich, Roman and Civil Law in American Legal Education and Re-
search Prior to 1930: A Preliminary Survey, 1984 U. Ill. L. Rev. 719, 728-30. 
9. This was the predecessor of the modem University of South Carolina. 
10. While the Lieber correspondence is scattered in a number of American libraries, the 
Story-Lieber correspondence is found especially in the collection, bought from Lieber's fam-
ily, now at the Henry E. Huntington Library in San Marino, California. On this collection, 
see Charles B. Robson, Papers of Francis Lieber, 3 Huntington Library Bulletin, 135-55 
(1933). Lieber's letters and papers relating to his tenure at South Carolina College are now to 
be found in the Carolina Collection at the University of South Carolina in Columbia, S.C. A 
selection of Lieber's letters are in Thomas S. Perry, ed., The Life and Letters of Francis Lieber 
(J.R. Osgood and Co., 1882). 
II. The Hermeneutics appeared in three editions, the last of which, edited by W.G. 
Hammond, was published in St. Louis in 1881 as Francis Lieber, Legal and Political Herme-
neutics (Hammond, ed., F.H. Thomas and Co., 1880). On this text see Hoeflich, 1984 U. of 
Ill L. Rev. at 728-30 (cited in note 8) and A. Arthur Schiller, Roman lnterpretatio and Anglo-
American Interpretation and Construction, 27 Va. L. Rev. 733 (1941). 
12. Francis Lieber, On Civil Liberty and Self-Government, 2 vols. (Lippincott, 1853). 
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ics.D During this period, too, he tried desperately to convince his 
Northern colleagues (including Story and Greenleaf) to secure for 
him a position in the North away from the Southern problems of 
nullification, secession and slavery.t4 Finally, in the late 1850's he 
managed to be appointed to a professorship at Columbia College in 
New York, where he remained until his death.ts 
Obviously, the subject of statutory desuetude interested Lieber 
as a political theorist. The doctrine that a statute still on the books 
could become obsolete and be declared so by a judge is one that has 
found a congenial home in the civil law countries of the European 
continent, but it has never been popular in the Anglo-American 
world.t6 The concept had particularly significant political ramifica-
tions at the beginning of the nineteenth century, because this was a 
time during which the idea of judge-made law and of judicial review 
of statutes was still quite controversial.t7 It was also a time when 
Jacksonian populism had made its tenets felt and feared and when, 
as a result, talk of a connection between "popular will" and law was 
particularly notable.ts 
The work was reprinted several times; on this, see Freidel, Francis Lieber at 267 n.l8 (cited in 
note 7). 
13. Francis Lieber, Manual of Political Ethics Designed Chiefly for the Use of Colleges 
and Students at Law, 2 vols. (C. C. Little & I. Brown, 1838-39). The second edition of Phila-
delphia, 1875 is standard; on this, see Freidel, Francis Lieber at 145 n.3 (cited in note 7). 
14. Lieber was generally unhappy at South Carolina College; see William M. Geer, 
Francis Lieber at the South Carolina College, Proceedings of the South Carolina Historical 
Association, 3-22 (1943). 
IS. See Friedel, Francis Lieber at 293 (cited in note 7). See also Julius Goebel, Jr., ed., 
A History of the School of Law, Columbia University 44-67 (Colum. U. Press, 1955). In spite 
of Lieber's frequent entreaties to Story and Greenleaf he was never offered a position at 
Harvard. 
16. See Theodore F.T. Plucknett, A Concise History of the Common Law 337-39 (But-
terworth, 5th ed. 1956). Recently there has been some renewed American interest in the 
concept. See Guido Calabresi, A Common Law for the Age of Statutes (Harv. U. Press, 
1982). A rare exception is, Committee on Legal Ethics of the West Virginia State Bar v. 
Printz, 187 W.Va. 182,416 S.E.2d 720 (1992), which dismissed charges because of desuetude. 
17. See, e.g., Eakin v. Raub, 12 Serg. & Rawle 330, 347-49 (Pa. 1825) (Gibson, J., 
dissenting): "But it is by no means clear, that to declare a law void, which has been enacted 
according to the forms prescribed in the coustitution (sic), is not a usurpation of legislative 
power. . . . If the judiciary will inquire into anything beside the form of enactment, where 
shall it stop? .... [[T]he judiciary is not] infallible .... " As late as 1807 and 1808, the Ohio 
legislature impeached state judges because they had held that state Jaws were unconstitu-
tional. James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional 
Law, 7 Harv. L. Rev. 129, 134 (1893). 
In 1804, President Jefferson said: "But the opinion which gives to the judges the right to 
decide what laws are constitutional and what not, not only for themselves in their own sphere 
of action, but for the Legislature & Executive also, in their spheres, would make the judiciary 
a despotic branch." PaulL. Ford, ed., 8 The Writings of Thomas Jefferson 311 (G.P. Put-
nam's Sons, 1897). 
18. For example, President Jackson in his message regarding his veto of the bill to 
recharter the Bank of the United States, said: "The authority of the Supreme Court must 
not, therefore, be permitted to control the Congress or the Executive when acting in their 
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It is, therefore, quite interesting to notice the substantive con-
tent of Greenleafs letter to Lieber. Greenleaf declares himself to 
believe that law can only be properly understood as an expression of 
the sovereign will. Within the political universe of the early United 
States, a reference to the sovereign will, of course, must be to the 
"popular will" and, indeed, Greenleaf makes this connection. From 
this point, Greenleaf moves on to declare that the popular will is 
expressed in two forms: by the legislature and by the courts. While 
both are authoritative, Greenleaf suggests that the legislative 
"mouth" is, perhaps, of greater authority. More important, how-
ever, Greenleaf denies that there can be such a thing as a "legislat-
ing judge," but only a judge who "ascertains" and "declares" the 
"sense of the community." Judges should find, not make, law. If 
he is right in this declaration, he will be affirmed by legislative ac-
tion. If he is wrong, he will be overruled. 
With this background, it would seem difficult for Greenleaf to 
support a true doctrine of desuetude, separate from statutory revi-
sion. And, indeed, this was the case. But nonetheless Greenleaf 
found a way of mediating his discomfort with either allowing judges 
to declare statutes obsolete or allowing such statutes to stand in 
force. For this purpose, Greenleaf looks to the pardoning power 
and suggests that this power, when exercised properly by the execu-
tive of the state, will avoid both improper judicial legislation and 
injustice in those cases where the legislature has failed to abolish a 
statute no longer in accord with the popular will. 
In the context of a letter written in the late 1830's, Greenleafs 
theories are quite significant. He favored a weaker judiciary than 
many of his contemporaries; one cannot underestimate the demo-
cratic ideal of the importance of the "sovereign will of the people" 
as the ultimate source of law.l9 This expression of Greenleafs 
legislative capacities, but to have only such influence as the force of their reasoning may 
deserve." James D. Richardson, 3 A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents 
1145 (Bureau of National Literature, 1897). 
19. See Thayer, 7 Harv. L. Rev. at 129 (cited in note 17). Judges are "the depositaries 
of the laws; the Jiving oracles." William Blackstone, 1 Commentaries of the Law of England 
69• (Rees Welsh & Co., 1902). Even if the courts overturn a precedent, the early decision is 
not really "bad law" rather "it was not law; that is, that it is not the established custom of the 
realm, as has been erroneously determined." ld. at 70 (emphasis in original). Blackstone's 
Commentaries were very influential in eighteenth century America. See, e.g., Griffith J. 
McRee, I Life and Correspondence of James Iredell. One of the Associate Justices of the 
Supreme Court of the United States 91 (D. Appleton & Co., 1857); Dennis R. Nolan, Sir 
William Blackstone and the New American Republic: A Study of Intellectual Impact, 51 
N.Y.U.L. Rev. 731 (1976). The decisions of courts are merely "evidence" of what the law is. 
See, e.g., Rupert Cross, Precedent in English Law 23·25 (Claredon Press, 2 ed. 1968); Robert 
A. Leflar, Appellate Judicial Innovation, 27 Okla. L. Rev. 319, 323-35 (1974). 
Even Justice Holmes, who argued that the "common Jaw is not a brooding omnipresence 
in the sky," quickly added-"but the articulate voice of some sovereign or quasi-sovereign 
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views is particularly interesting historically, for it did not remain a 
private matter between Greenleaf and Lieber. In 1838 Greenleaf 
published an introductory lecture he had given at the Harvard Law 
School in the then popular legal periodical, the Law Reporter.20 
This published lecture, is, in fact, a melange of the actual lecture he 
gave at Harvard (now Huntington Library manuscript LI 218) and 
the letter printed here.21 Thus, the ideas Greenleaf set forth in this 
letter to Lieber in 1837 appeared in print the next year, as part of a 
published lecture. This letter, then, lets us see, for a formative pe-
riod in American law, the notions Professor Greenleaf was develop-
ing on the proper roles of the judiciary and legislature and, thereby, 
to understand the views of an influential jurist and Harvard profes-
sor on this important question of public law. 
Note on the Text 
The text printed here is transcribed from a manuscript now in 
the Huntington Library in San Marino, California, catalogued as 
Huntington Ms. LI 1568.22 It is written and signed by Greenleaf 
and is among the Lieber papers. Another manuscript in this collec-
tion, Huntington Ms. LI 218, contains the text ofGreenlears intro-
ductory lecture as given at Harvard and published, in part, in the 
Law Reporter for December 1838.23 Following the text of the letter 
are printed the first five paragraphs of the introductory lecture pub-
lished in the Law Reporter, which derive from the letter to Lieber. 
• • • 
[Huntington Ms. LI 1568] 
Cambridge, Oct. 26, 1837 
My Dear Sir: 
I have great pleasure in sending you the enclosed official ac-
knowledgment for your kind donation of the Bavarian Code to our 
Law Library, but I will confess to you the livelier and mellower 
pleasure with which I pasted inside the cover your yellow letter to 
Sumner in which this gift is mentioned as a memorial of personal 
regard for the trio composed of the Judge, Sumner and your humble 
that can be identified," in Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, 
J., dissenting). 
20. See published extract to follow. 
21. The authors wish to thank Professor Alfred Konefsky for drawing their attention to 
the version printed in the Law Reporter. 
22. The authors wish to thank the Trustees of the Huntington Library with whose kind 
permission the letter is printed here. They also wish to acknowledge the financial support of 
the National Endowment for the Humanities for a "Travel to Collections" grant. 
23. The unpublished lecture is discussed by Perry Miller, The Life of the Mind in 
America From the Revolution to the Civil War 161-62 (Harcourt, Brace & World, 1965). 
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servant. 24 I begged it of him for the purpose; and we will go to our 
successors together. 
He desired me to send you a note of some English statutes still 
existing on the statute book, not repealed in terms, yet fallen into 
profound desuetude. (Pardon this word.) As our collection of Eng-
lish statutes is incomplete I suppose it out of my power to give you 
an example on which reliance can be placed, and therefore have not 
searched. On this matter of obsolete statutes, and of what is termed 
by men of a certain school "Judge-made-law," as well as of the 
source of all legal obligation I have some notions, perhaps crude, 
which I should like, above all things, to discuss with you in person; 
but as that is out of the question, I will state very briefly the heads 
and "catch words," if you will not regard it as too severe an inflic-
tion; and then ask you for a simple yea or nay expressive of your 
opinion. 
I think you will agree with me, that law is but another name 
for the will of the sovereign. The sovereign is the people. Disguise 
it as we may, the real basis of sovereignty, at the present day, and 
under whatever form of government, is the will of the people. This 
invisible but resistless power is also called public opinion. By this is 
meant, not the blind will of the populace; but the consenting suf-
frages of reflecting minds, including both unlearned and leamed.2s 
Against this will or opinion no statute can be executed however sol-
emnly enacted, and what this will require, must inevitably soon as-
sume some external norm of law. 
This sovereign has two modes of declaring its will;-two 
mouths, from which to speak its mind; namely, the legislature and 
the judiciary. The former gives form and body to its express and 
mandatory will, by statutes; and is supreme-the latter, to its will as 
inferred and deduced from allowed customs, usages and habits of 
social life; and it also expounds and interprets as well as continues 
the statutes. 
When public opinion, or the will of the sovereign changes, in a 
matter not contained in an express statute, the change is shown in 
the decisions of the judicial tribunals.26 [For example, the old opin-
24. The "judge," of course, is Story. "Sumner" refers to Charles Sumner, a leading 
Massachusetts lawyer and statesman and sometime lecturer at Harvard. On Lieber and Sum-
ner, see Frank Freidel, Francis Lieber, Charles Sumner, and Slavery, 9 J. of Southern History 
75-93 (1943). 
25. See Ronald D. Rotunda and John E. Nowak, Introduction to Joseph Story: Com-
mentaries on the Constitution of the United States§§ 153, 178, 186 (Carolina Academic Press, 
1987) (Story's rules of interpretation). 
26. ld. at§ 190-98. See also Walter V. Schaefer, Precedent and Policy, 34 U. Chi. L. 
Rev. 3, 20-22 (1966); Robert E. Keeton, Venturing to Do Justice; Reforming Private Law 15-
24 (Harv. U. Press, 1969); John Hanna, The Role of Precedent in Judicial Decision, 2 Villa-
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ion that a "heathen" could not be admitted as a competent witness, 
because he could not appeal to the Christian's God; now exploded, 
by appealing to his conscience through the solemnities of his own 
religion, so of many others. ]27 This is not because the law is uncer-
tain, in its very nature. It was equally clear before, though the other 
way. It is not that former Judges were ignorant, or inconsiderate, 
or rash. They were as wise and learned and able then, as now. It is 
not that they have usurped the province of the legislature. There is 
no such being as a legislating Judge, no "Judge-made law." What if 
the doctrine today pronounced from the bench is not found, in so 
many words, in any law book? It does not follow that the Judge 
made it. He has merely ascertained and declared the sense of the 
community, as already evinced in its usages and habits of business. 
If he has not expressed it correctly, his decision would be reversed 
tomorrow, or corrected by a statute. Indeed, a doubtful decision is 
not unfrequently followed by a statute, either affirming or overrul-
ing it, as the Judge may have succeeded or failed in expressing the 
public will. [For example, the British public in Queen Ann's time, 
were in favor of permitting the endorsee of a promissory note to sue 
in his own name. The exigencies of commerce required it. The 
Judges ruled that it was contrary to the doctrines of the common 
law. Whereupon the public will to the contrary was declared in the 
Statute of Ann.ps In fine, the Judge is one functionary, declaring 
the public will, the legislator is another declaring the same, yet in a 
more emphatic and authoritative manner. The former is the Vizier, 
expressing what he supposes to be the will of the Prince, the latter is 
the Kal Hatre-the "word of the King,"-the officer who stands 
next his person, and knows his intentions. I say this much in vindi-
cation of the Courts and their decisions, and the law itself. 
But then what are we to do with obsolete statutes. This term, 
obsolete, is applicable to various statutes in various degrees, from 
the first stage of neglect, to the deepest slumber of forgetfulness. 
Yet they may all be still, in some degree, the depositories of the 
public will, though not of a will so intense and active and imperative 
as at first. There are other statutes which are now dead bodies, 
from which the soul of public opinion has departed. But all this last 
class, I think, and probably most of the former, will be found to be 
nova L. Rev. 367 (1957); Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 19-21 
(Yale U. Press, 1921). 
27. On this, see Simon Greenleaf, I A Treatise on the Law of Evidence § 328 (C. C. Little 
and J. Brown, 5th ed. 1850). 
28. The reference is to 3 & 4 ANNE, ch. 9 (1704), in Danby Pickering, ed., II The 
Statutes at Large I 06-07 (Joseph Bentham, 1758); see Frederick K. Beutel, The Development 
of Negotiable Instruments in Early English Law, 51 Harv. L. Rev. 813, 842-43 (1938). 
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penal in their enactments, for in regard to statutes remedial and 
directory, as these are of daily use, they are always changed by 
other statutes, as soon as they are found inadequate to the exigen-
cies of the community. 
Now in regard to obsolete penal statutes, there is yet a third 
functionary, or mouthpiece of the sovereign will. I mean the Exec-
utive, in the exercise of the pardoning power. Morally speaking, the 
Executive cannot punish a man whom the public have pardoned nor 
pardon one whose punishment is demanded by the deliberate sense 
of the people.29 
A wise legislature will occasionally revise its penal code, for the 
sake of obliterating these dead statutes, which sometimes put citi-
zens to the expense and vexation of a trial at law, in order to reach 
the Executive organ of the public will. I say sometimes for in a 
clear case of obsoleteness, no public prosecuting officer will be so 
unwise as to draw a bill of indictment.Jo The more common incon-
venience of obsolete statutes is that they may entangle the con-
science of the upright citizen, who feels bound to obey the law, in all 
the extent of its requirements. But where the question of obsolete-
ness is not clear, let him obey the language of the statute. And if 
the usage and practice of the community is clearly and universally 
the other way, and the matter is indifferent in a moral view, let him 
obey the public will, as shown in the universal usage; and if he is 
prosecuted and convicted, the pardoning power will absolve him. If 
the statute is merely prohibitory, the good man can always refrain 
from the thing prohibited. And where the matter is not indifferent 
in a moral view, let him obey God rather than man. The Quaker, 
by refusing to bear arms and to swear, because it was contrary to 
what he believed to be the law of God; though at first convicted and 
punished, was soon pardoned, and next was absolved by express 
statutes in his favor. 
These hints may enable you to understand my views in general 
of this matter. If you entertain others in regard to obsolete statutes, 
I shall profit by them, when made known. 
I am greatly edified by your work on Hermeneutics;Jt and have 
cited it in Moot Court as the best authority on Interpret~tion and 
29. For an historical review and analysis of modem developments of the pardon power, 
see Ronald D. Rotunda and John E. Nowak, I Treatise on Constitutional Law: Substance 
and Procedure§ 7.5 (West Publishing Co., 2d ed. 1992). 
30. This is a theme worked out in greater detail in the version printed in the Law 
Reporter. 
31. See supra note II. 
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Construction, commending it earnestly to the study of the School.32 
My wife also is reading it, con amore-or rather we are reading it 
together-for she is fond of such studies-as well as myself. 
Now adieu, my dear sir; and pardon this long epistle, from 
Dr. Lieber 
Very truly yours, 
Simon Greenleaf 
• • • 
[Extract from The Law Report, vol. 1, n.8 
(Dec., 1838), pp. 217-218] 
However jurists may differ in their definitions of municipal 
law, they come substantially on the same result-that it is the ex-
pression of the sovereign will, or, "the expression of the will of 
human Society, Constituted into a State." (Lieber's Pol. Eth. 106.) 
It is that, whatever it be, by which we are obliged to regulate our 
civil conduct. 
This public will is either organized, or unorganized. In its lat-
ter state it is usually termed public opinion. By public opinion, we 
are to understand the general sentiment of the community, made up 
of individual opinions, modified by one another. It is that invisible 
but resistless agent, which regulates our political and civil conduct, 
in all cases not provided for by express and positive laws. Nay, it 
may be said, in some sort, to control even these laws; since, in gen-
eral, against the public opinion, it is seldom that any statute can be 
executed; and whatever it demands, must inevitably assume some 
external form of law. 
In the organization and promulgation of the public will, there 
are two principal agents-the legislature and the judiciary. These 
are the two principal means by which the sovereign will is declared. 
The former announces its express mandates, by statutes; and is 
supreme, except as it is controlled by constitutional provisions. The 
latter gives expression to the public will, as inferred and deduced 
from the allowed and general customs, usages and habits of social 
life; and is also the expositor of the statutes. 
When public opinion, or the will of the sovereign changes, in a 
matter not contained in an express statute, this change is shown in 
the decisions of the judicial tribunals. It is not that the law is uncer-
tain. It was equally clear before. It is not that former judges were 
ignorant or inconsiderate. They were as wise, and as learned, and 
32. Lieber's book, while generally held in high regard by academics, never had wide-
spread success, though it was, in fact, cited twice by the United States Supreme Court. 
102 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 10:93 
as able then, as now. Their decisions, in both cases, were but reflec-
tions of the public mind. It is not that they have usurped the place 
of the Legislature. The phrase, "Judge-made law," belongs only to 
the ignorant and unreflecting. What though the doctrine pro-
nounced from the bend to day, is not found in any existing law 
book? It does not follow that the judge has made the law. He has 
merely ascertained and declared the sense of the community, as it is 
already evinced in its usages and habits of business. If in this he has 
erred, his decision will be overruled tomorrow or corrected by a 
more emphatic and direct expression of the public will, in a statute. 
A decision of doubtful correctness is not unfrequently followed by a 
statute, either affirming or overruling it, as the judge may have suc-
ceeded, or not, in expressing the law, or in other words, the public 
will. The judge is one functionary, declaring this will; the legislator 
is another, declaring the same, with higher authority. 
Statutes which regulate the daily private intercourse of men, 
and define and protect their private rights, never become obsolete; 
but are changed, as the circumstances of men change, and new 
phases of society call for new modifications of law. Statutes which 
have become obsolete, will, in general, be found to be those which 
provide for the punishment of offenses against the State. In regard 
to these there is yet another functionary, expressing the public 
will-1 mean the executive, in the exercise of the remitting or par-
doning power. The executive magistrate of a popular government, 
cannot, morally speaking, suffer a man to be punished, whom the 
public have pardoned; he is coerced, by this circumstance, to give to 
this pardon its legal form and force. Nor, on the other hand, can he 
pardon one, whose punishment is demanded by the deliberate voice 
and general sense of the community, as justly due to its violated 
laws. He may, and he ought to withstand the blind will of a pas-
sionate and excited populace. It is only the sober and matured 
judgment of the great body of society that he will find himself un-
able to disregard. A fainter and less perfect expression of the public 
will is made through grand juries and the prosecuting officers; 
when, in the exercise of sound discretion, they forbear to charge as 
criminals those who may inadvertently have been betrayed into a 
solitary violation of the penal or fiscal codes, and whose offence has 
already, in some other mode, been substantially atoned for and for-
given. Though no such discretion is legally and expressly vested in 
these functionaries, yet in the practical working of the system, it is 
found that offenders of this kind are, in fact, seldom brought under 
their official notice. It is one of the modes in which the general 
sense of the community does, in fact, cause itself to be respected, in 
cases where the community alone is the party injured. Thus the 
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penal code is made ultimately to bear upon none but real offenders; 
penalties unwittingly incurred are remitted, and the great objects of 
penal justice being obtained, the penitent and reformed culprit is 
forgiven. 
